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In this paper, we present the evolution and state of the art of both 
quantitative forecasting and scenario-based foresight methods that can be 
applied to help prevent governance breakdown and violent conflict in 
Europe’s neighbourhood. In the quantitative section, we describe the 
different phases of conflict forecasting in political science and outline 
which methodological gaps EU-LISTCO’s quantitative sub-national 
prediction tool will address to forecast tipping points for violent conflict 
and governance breakdown. The qualitative section explains EU-LISTCO’s 
scenario-based foresight methodology for identifying potential tipping 
points. After comparing both approaches, we discuss opportunities for 
methodological advancements across the boundaries of quantitative 
forecasting and scenario-based foresight, as well as how they can inform 
the design of strategic policy options. 
1. ANTICIPATING GOVERNANCE BREAKDOWN AND VIOLENT 
CONFLICT 
The EU-LISTCO project researches how a combination of different risk factors in the 
European Union’s neighbourhood contribute to tipping points for governance 
breakdown and violent conflict at which security threats to the EU and its citizens 
emerge, and how the EU and its member states can respond (Börzel and Risse 2018). 
One way to address this challenge is by analysing past instances of violence and 
breakdown of basic governance services, assuming that a better understanding of 
the past is a sufficient basis for developing the tools to address future threats. While 
this traditional way of doing empirical research is important, the future tends to 
surprise us. The popular uprisings and subsequent conflict across the Middle East 
and North Africa and the war in Ukraine are two examples of events within the EU’s 
immediate neighbourhood that took both researchers and policy makers by surprise 
and challenged assumptions about how, when and where security threats emerge. 
To address EU-LISTCO’s main research question on how different combinations of 
risk factors and societal resilience as a mitigating factor affect the tipping points at 
which risks turn into threats, we apply two sets of methods: quantitative forecasting 
and scenario-based foresight methods. The selection and application of these 
methods is guided by EU-LISTCO’s conceptual framework (Börzel and Risse 2018). 
The framework starts from the assumption that the EU’s neighbourhood is 
characterized by two main risk factors: limited statehood and contested orders. 
Limited statehood refers to a state’s limited ability to control the use of violence and 
enforce rules. Contested orders are constellations in which “state and non-state 


























Sarah Bressan, Håvard Mokleiv   
Nygård, and Dominic Seefeldt 
Forecasting and Foresigh 
EU-LISTCO Working Paper No. 2/ September 2019 
https://www.eu-listco.net 
 
Forecasting and Foresight  
Sarah Bressan, Håvard Mokleiv Nygård, and Dominic Seefeldt 
7 
 
political systems are or should be organized” (Börzel and Risse 2018: 4). Both 
conditions are ubiquitous and are not in themselves threats to European security, 
but they are risk factors for violent conflict and governance breakdown which 
threaten Europe’s stability and security. 
In this first methodological paper, we answer the questions: (1) What quantitative 
and scenario-based qualitative methods are available to better anticipate and prepare 
for future violent conflict and governance breakdown? (2) How can they be 
combined? To address these questions, we present the state of the art of both 
methods. In the first part, we give an overview of the quantitative methods available 
to forecast violent conflict and, to a lesser extent, governance breakdown. After that, 
we present the scenario-based methods that are available to build a toolkit for 
foresight processes identifying tipping points for violent conflict and governance 
breakdown in the EU‘s neighbourhood. In section four, we take a comparative 
approach to discuss opportunities to combine quantitative and qualitative 
approaches, taking into account their strengths and weaknesses when anticipating 
threats and developing preventive strategies. We show that, despite their different 
epistemological approaches, there is plenty of room for advancements across the 
boundaries of both methodologies to support the design of strategic policy options. 
The concluding discussion summarises the opportunities and challenges at hand 
and outlines how the research on identifying methods for anticipating governance 
breakdown and violent conflict contributes to EU-LISTCO’s research goals. 
2. QUANTITATIVE FORECASTING OF ARMED CONFLICT AND 
POLITICAL VIOLENCE1 
Forecasting armed conflict has a long history in political science. Indeed, in his 
presidential address to the Peace Science Society, J. David Singer (1973:1), one of the 
pioneers of modern social science, remarked: 
[N]o matter how I turn it over in my mind, the number one task of peace 
research always turns out to be that of prediction: the ability to forecast, 
with increasing reliability, the outcomes which are most likely to emerge 
out of a given set of background conditions and behavioural events. And it 
seems to me that this holds whether our concern is to aid, augment, 
bypass, or subvert those who now decide questions of war and peace.  
This ambition sparked a broad and thriving literature on forecasting armed conflict. 
Although the ambition can be traced back to the start of systematic analyses of 
                                                          
1
  This section focuses primarily on the literature geared towards forecasting conflict and political 
violence. It touches, in section 2.4, on forecasting of some types of governance breakdown, but 
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armed conflict, interest in forecasting has waxed and waned over time. In general, 
efforts at forecasting armed conflict and political violence can be understood as 
developing across three generations (based on Nygård [2015] and Hegre et al. [2017a, 
2018]). 
2.1 First Generation 
The first generation of conflict prediction was inspired by the work of Sorokin (1962), 
Richardson (1960a) and Wright ([1942], 1965). It was heavily influenced by the 
foundational work of J. David Singer and the broad Correlates of War Project in 1963, 
aiming to systematically accumulate scientific knowledge about war (Small and 
Singer, 1982). Early-warning purposes were explicitly included among the aims of 
this effort (Singer and Wallace, 1979). These efforts also included the first attempts at 
utilizing event type data, often highly granular data of the ‘who did what to whom, 
where, and when’ form. Such early events data projects also highlighted forecasting 
(e.g., Azar et al. [1977]). Pioneering work by Azar (1980) and McClelland and Hoggard 
(1968) provided templates for collecting fine-grained data sufficiently effective to 
approximate real-time conflict early warning. 
This first enthusiasm for conflict prediction quickly faded, however, as it became 
clear that the results did not match the initially high ambitions, and, throughout the 
1970s and early 1980s, explicit efforts to use statistical models to predict or warn 
against armed conflict were relatively rare (exceptions do exist, see e.g., Ward [1984] 
and Zinnes and Muncaster [1984]).  
2.2 Second Generation 
The second generation of conflict prediction started in earnest in the early 1980s. 
Two innovations were particularly important in this period: first, the explicit linking 
of theory and prediction, particularly in the development of game-theoretic models 
specifically aimed at producing predictions; second, the introduction and 
development, for social science, of computational methods often more appropriate 
for forecasting. In terms of linking theory and prediction, Bruce Bueno de Mesquita 
(1980, 1983, 1984) in particular made explicit the link between theory and conflict 
prediction by using game-theoretical models to predict armed conflict as well as 
other foreign and domestic policy events. In terms of developing computational 
methods, the work of Philip Schrodt (and colleagues) stands out. From the late 1980s, 
Schrodt has been building statistical models based on extensive news source data to 
predict armed conflict. Schrodt (1988, 1991) used methods from artificial intelligence 
and machine learning, including neural networks, to predict state-based conflict, 
which are now increasingly common in the discipline.  
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to make use of more granular data (Schrodt, Davis and Weddle 1994). Schrodt is also a 
pioneer in moving away from the widely used country-year datasets, constructed 
from the Correlates of War collection of data and similar sources, to instead use 
more high-resolution event type data attempts to track ‘who did what to whom, 
where, and when’ at as finely-grained temporal and spatial a level as possible. 
Schrodt, Davis and Weddle (1994) introduced algorithms for automatically 
classifying and coding political events based on large amounts of news articles. 
These techniques have since been further refined and now allow the discipline to use 
increasingly fine-grained data to code both dependent and independent variables. 
While the country-year format pushed the discipline forward (Beck, King and Zeng 
2000; Gurr and Lichbach 1986; Gurr and Moore 1997; Harff 2003), empirical analysis 
and forecasts alike are increasingly cast on a daily, weekly, or monthly level (e.g., 
Brandt, Freeman and Schrodt [2011]; Doyle et al. [2014]; Schrodt and Gerner [2000]). 
This is reflected in the increasing demand for spatio-temporally-disaggregated 
event data (Cederman and Gleditsch 2009; Weidmann and Ward 2010). 
2.3 Third Generation 
The focus on early warning and the ambition to see it realised articulated in the 
second generation of conflict forecasting led to a substantial amount of policy 
interest in this area. A high-water mark in this respect was the development of the 
US government-financed State Failure Task Force (SFTF, later re-named the Political 
Instability Task Force PITF) – which marked the advent of the third generation of 
conflict forecasting. The goal of the PITF was to predict a wide range of political 
instabilities ranging from coups and revolutions to armed conflict two years before 
they occurred. Goldstone et al. conclude that the PITF studies “have substantially 
achieved that objective” (2010: 204). One of the key insights from the PITF is that 
simplistic models with a few powerful variables performed just as well as complex 
models, at least at the country-year level. Beginning in the mid-late 2000s, conflict 
prediction became a very active sub-discipline of conflict research and is now 
increasingly seen as a ‘mainstream’ effort by the wider scientific community 
(Schneider, Gleditsch and Carey 2011). This push was driven by the ambition to predict 
in itself, but it was also given additional academic weight by the realisation, most 
succinctly communicated by Ward et al. (2010) and Schrodt (2014), that prediction is 
often a better way of evaluating research than more traditional significance and p-
value based approaches to testing estimates. In short, a prediction framework allows 
researchers to assess the extent to which their models, or individual variables, are able 
to recreate the observed data.  
This realisation of some of the fundamental weaknesses of p-value approaches 
marks a major turn in the third generation of conflict forecasting. We see a clear 
move away from hypothesis testing using p-values to more and more use of out-of-
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using one subset to train the model and other subsets to evaluate it. Out-of-sample 
methods, developed in particular in the works of Hastie and Tibshirani (2009), are 
particularly well suited for guarding against overfitting – the tendency to fit data to 
noise instead of measuring signal. For work purely aimed at theory testing, ensuring 
that models are not over-fitted is an important concern. For efforts directly aimed at 
forecasting and early warning, however, it is absolutely fundamental. Out-of-sample 
methods have thus today become a staple methodology for researchers doing 
conflict forecasting. 
Over the same period, we have also seen important methodological innovations. 
These include, in particular, the use of ensemble methods and tree-based 
approaches. Ensemble methods, routinely used in meteorological forecasting, work 
by leveraging a range of different models that, by themselves, effectively capture 
some particular aspect of a complex phenomenon and that together, when properly 
weighted, are able to produce much more reliable forecasts for the macr -
phenomenon of interest than any one model by itself (see also the discussion of the 
ViEWS project below). Tree-based approaches, often called decision trees, have been 
shown to be very useful for prediction tasks where the final outcome often relies on 
a range of interactions between variables. Random forest approaches, a particular 
tree-based approach to country-level forecasting, have been shown to improve 
predictive performance dramatically compared to general linear models (Colaresi 
and Mahmood 2017; Muchlinski et al. 2016). Tree-based approaches are less well suited 
for theory development, however, since it is often hard to pinpoint exactly which 
variable, or set of variables, is important for predicting the outcome. 
Prediction is now used throughout the discipline of peace and conflict research. 
Greatly helped by the advances in computationally intensive methods to collect and 
analyse data, researchers increasingly follow Schrodt in using automated event-
coded data from news wires to study, for instance, how public opinion affects the 
Israel-Palestine conflict (Brandt, Colaresi and Freeman 2008), or whether news data 
can be used to predict the outbreak of the First World War (Chadefaux 2014). The 
focus is not confined to armed conflict, but extends to predicting issues related to 
governance breakdown such as irregular leadership transfers (e.g., Beger, Dorff and 
Ward [2014]) and coups d’état (Bell 2018), as well as one-sided violence (e.g., Scharpf et 
al. [2014]), social movements (e.g., Chenoweth and Ulfelder [2017]), and many other 
forms of political violence (Ward et al. 2013) and their consequences (Hegre et al. 
2017b). These studies have in common that they use data at a granular level 
(sometimes days or months instead of years) to predict conflict in the short term. 
Other studies rely on country-year data to produce long-range predictions. Hegre et 
al. (2013, 2016) forecast civil conflict many decades into the future, as do Witmer et al. 
(2017), and explore how different scenarios for UN Peacekeeping deployment would 
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2.4 Contemporary Efforts 
Several ongoing conflict and political violence forecasting initiatives are currently 
active. At the country level these include the already mentioned PITF and the EU 
Global Conflict Risk Index (European Commission 2019). In the next one to four 
years, the EU Global Conflict Risk Index aims to provide risk assessment for violent 
conflict at the country level using quantitative and open source indicators. More 
specialised initiatives include the US Holocaust Museum’s Early Warning Project 
that has been producing regular early warnings for mass atrocities and the One Earth 
Foundation which is producing coup d’état risk forecasts. Other projects focus on 
more granular data and are pitched at a more fine-grained geographic or temporal 
level. The Integrated Crisis Early Warning System (ICEWS) in particular has focused 
on a range of domestic and international crises graded by intensity (O'Brien 2010). 
Particularly valuable insights from ICEWS include separate modelling of conflict 
phases (onset, continuation and termination) as well as the utility of a multi-method 
approach to forecasting. 
The most relevant ongoing project to EU-LISTCO is the Uppsala-based ViEWS – a 
violence early warning project. ViEWS is particularly relevant since it aims at sub-
national prediction of several different types of armed conflict. The knowledge and 
lessons learned from ViEWS will directly contribute to EU-LISTCO’s development of 
a prediction model. ViEWS will provide early warnings for three forms of political 
violence recorded by the UCDP – armed conflict involving states and rebel groups, 
armed conflict between non-state actors, violence against civilians – and for forced 
population displacement, and will apply these to specific actors, sub-national 
geographical units, and countries (Hegre et al. 2019a). ViEWS is by far the most 
ambitious early warning project currently in operation. The project aims to make 
substantial theoretical and methodological innovations. Theoretical developments 
are focused in particular on studying the mechanisms that lead to conflict or conflict 
escalation and using this knowledge to build theoretically informed forecasting 
models. Methodologically core innovations centre on the use of ensemble methods 
to leverage the strengths of particular models to build a more holistic system for 
forecasting conflict. 
None of these existing efforts are explicitly tailored to tackle the issues of contested 
orders and areas of limited statehood from the EU-LISTCO project’s conceptual 
framework (Börzel and Risse 2018). The forecasting methodology developed by EU-
LISTCO will address these issues directly, requiring both theoretical and 
methodological innovation. Theoretically, the core tasks will be to develop a model 
that captures the concepts of contested orders and areas of limited statehood as 
effectively as possible in order to build models capable of forecasting governance 
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quantitative forecasting and qualitative foresight methodology than has hitherto 
been established (see Nygård et al. 2019). To this end, we work in a Bayesian 
modelling framework that allows us to assess the extent to which it is possible to 
include qualitative foresight expertise directly in statistical modelling through the 
use of informed priors (Gill and Walker 2005). This sets EU-LISTCO apart from other 
ongoing efforts. 
The current quantitative forecasting literature has only addressed the issue of 
tipping points to a very limited extent. Part of the reason for this is simply that what 
constitutes a tipping point, or indeed how to define one, remains unclear. 
Nonetheless, the idea of a tipping point in a social or political process, or variously a 
critical juncture, or a structural change, or simply a turning point, is found throughout 
political science. Some attempts to at least partially account for tipping points can, 
however, be found. Hegre at al. (2013), for instance, model the onset of armed conflict 
as a Markov process. Markov processes are very useful for studying processes that 
occur in distinct steps. As part of such processes, it is also possible to co sid r 
situations that become relatively stable once a particular step has been reached – i.e., 
a tipping point has been crossed. More recently, some literature has also begun to 
more explicitly model tipping points using ‘change point’ models that appear 
particularly useful for our purposes here. A change point model is a formal 
statistical model for finding a change, often called a break point. In a time series, this 
break point can then be interpreted as the tipping point. We plan to draw on recent 
work on change point analyses, using as our starting points models such as those 
developed by Blackwell (2018) or Cunen et al. (2018), to study the extent to which a 
useful model can be developed that would help us predict when a tipping point 
occurs in a process that begins with less organised and more non-violent protest but 
which ends in organised armed conflict. This, however, will remain in an 
experimental or pilot phase. 
3. SCENARIOS AS QUALITATIVE RISK-SCANNING INSTRUMENTS 
3.1 The Logic of Scenarios 
“Today, the question of what scenarios are is unclear except with regard to one point 
– they have become increasingly popular” (Mietzner and Reger 2005: 220). It is 
difficult to define a term that has become, as Kosow and Gaßner put it, a “vogue” 
(2008: 44). Scenarios have not only become popular in societal discourse and the 
media as a tool for communication but are increasingly used in consulting and 
scientific practice. This has brought about a diverse and growing range of 
methodologies and understandings. Nevertheless, the following aims to provide a 
working definition for the purposes of this project (based on Gabriel [2013] and 
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events with explicit reference to the future. They are the result of a conscious and 
deliberate group process of construction without any claim to be predictive. They 
must therefore always be thought of in the plural – meaning that there are, by 
definition, multiple scenarios for the topic in question. 
Bishop (2007) highlights that scenarios must necessarily consist of both the situation 
in the future and the development leading up to that situation. A scenario for the 
year 2023 created in 2018 will therefore consist of a description of the situation in the 
year 2023 as well as a timeline starting in 2018 and ending in 2023. Scenarios are 
pictures and histories of the future. 
Scenarios are based on a conception of the future as being complex, and highlight 
the epistemic status of the future as being inherently unknowable. They are thusly to 
be differentiated from prognoses, predictions or forecasts, which – given the 
necessary amount of resources and effort – are predictive in nature and do not 
necessarily need a history, meaning that the developments leading to the pred ct d 
situation are not provided. Prognoses based on probability, therefore, often appear 
in the singular, as their predictive claim does not require alternatives. 
The concepts of possibility and probability are central to the validation of analytical 
proof, justification, critique, and falsification in science (Gabriel 2014). If this is taken 
as a starting point, how can scenarios that are by definition not probable and that do 
not claim to be predictive be logically justified? In this view, deductive reasoning is 
not an option, since it would go against a conception of the future as complex and 
inherently unknowable. Deductive reasoning would linearly extrapolate the future 
and create the illusion of knowledge – a process that scenario construction, 
especially in the context of risk scanning, must explicitly avoid. Inductive reasoning 
is a much more fruitful approach. So-called problems of induction (Popper 1963) are 
not applicable to scenarios, as they do not seek to establish truth, but rather to create 
an illustration of possibilities. Other scientific issues regarding inductive reasoning 
– such as the lack of possible empirical verification (Hume 1978, [1739]) – are also 
circumvented by the topic of inquiry being the future. Something that is not yet 
factual cannot be verified anyway, especially not through empiricism. 
Yet, inductive postulation can be seen as an illustration of customs or habits. These 
postulations are to be judged not on the basis of their truth or validity, but on their 
usefulness: 
Hume argues that the fact that these inferences do follow the course of 
nature is a kind of ‘pre-established harmony’ [...]. It is a kind of natural 
instinct, which may in fact be more effective in making us successful in 
the world, than if we relied on reason to make these inferences. 
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When constructing scenarios, it is more useful to generate hypotheses about the 
future that are meaningful – that are creating sense – than to produce the illusion of 
knowledge about an inherently unknowable future. Hypotheses about the future are 
always based on human experience but are not tied to it. To create plausible 
explanations in a group process means to combine past experiences of different 
people and thus to create new knowledge (Gabriel 2014). 
This new knowledge – scenarios as pictures and histories of the future – can be 
criticised in three ways. Firstly, critics can and should discover and present 
background information that has not been included in the construction process and 
that renders the current iteration of the scenario implausible. Background 
information that has been included in the construction process but not been made 
explicit should at least be challenged since hidden premises might lead to hidden 
bias in scenarios. Diverse and therefore good scenarios are enriched by the 
assumptions of a diverse group, which should be explicitly stated. Secondly, critics 
can and should challenge the plausibility of scenarios. Since scenarios can ot be 
analysed empirically, this has to happen through critical discourse. That is why 
scenarios cannot be created alone but are necessarily the outcome of a group process. 
Thirdly, critics can and should generate hypotheses that cover an even wider 
spectrum of possibilities, thereby diversifying scenarios through the inclusion of 
different concepts and theories. 
Hierarchies of knowledge sources are directly dependent on the conception of 
knowledge. Knowledge about the future – which necessarily constitutes an advance 
into the realm of the unpredictable – requires different hierarchies of knowledge 
sources than classical scientific enquiries directed primarily at empirical analysis. 
Because future risks are not yet here and cannot be found empirically, they must be 
created through reasonably combining experiences. Three kinds of sources of 
knowledge are therefore of special importance to the construction of scenarios 
(Gabriel 2013): (1) sources of experience, such as observations and experiments, (2) 
sources of reason, such as thought experiments, and (3) analogies that fall in the 
middle of the spectrum between sources of experience and sources of reason. Among 
these sources, the thought experiment takes centre stage, as it poses what-if 
questions. Analogies and metaphors enrich these experiments by adding the as-if. 
Experience (merely) constitutes the necessary conditions by providing the what-was, 
while necessarily operating in the background due to its reference to the past. 
Special status in the realm of risk scanning can be granted to analogies, “one of the 
most interesting sources of knowledge, having a rich history” (Elkana 1981: 21), as 
well as to metaphors. Analogies and metaphors aim at comparison and highlight 
similarities in different ways. Analogies explicitly compare structures across 
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and highlight similar features and relational qualities that do not necessarily aim at 
structural equality between different spheres. Taken literally, metaphors are simply 
false, although they may also point to basic differences in order to stimulate the 
audience to search for similarities (Duit 1991). Both analogies and metaphors can be 
especially useful in the field of qualitative risk scanning, as they seek to combine 
sources of experience and sources of reason in order to create something new.  
Finally, and most importantly, thought experiments are never fully objective or 
completely intersubjective. Exclusively employing thought experiments can 
therefore never transform the unknowable into knowledge. They are, however, 
irreplaceable as tools for thinking about the future, combining via analogies the 
sources of experience and the sources of reason in order to make the possible 
imaginable and communicable (Gabriel 2013). It is this combination of sources of 
knowledge that can create actionability in the face of uncertainty. By combining 
thought experiments and analogies, experiences are rendered future compliant. 
3.2 Scenario Techniques 
There are a variety of techniques available to identify and assess factors that are 
influential in light of the scenario topic. For the purpose of identifying and assessing 
risks, EU-LISTCO conducts scenario workshops that simultaneously serve as a 
communication platform between researchers and policy experts. Multiple scenarios 
are created in these workshops using a combination of some of the techniques 
presented in the following overview.2 Following Kosow and Gaßner (2008), the 
scenario process can be divided into the five following phases (see Figure 1): (1) 
scenario field identification, (2) key factor identification, (3) key factor assessment, (4) 
scenario generation, and (5) scenario transfer. 
Other authors have opted for 3 phases (Mißler-Behr 1993), four phases (Burmeister et 
al. 2004; Dießl 2006; Phelps et al. 2001), or eight phases (Steinmüller 2002). Although 
these authors have opted for different levels of division when categorising the stages 
of a foresight project, the general content of these stages is rather similar. How these 
stages are to be realised, however, varies greatly, both in the foresight literature and 
in practice (Kosow and Gaßner 2008). 
  
                                                          
2
  The structure for this overview is proposed by Kosow and Gaßner (2008) and adjusted by the 
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Figure 1: Stages of scenario-based foresight projects 
Source: Kosow and Gaßner (2008: 25) 
3.2.1 Scenario Field Identification 
The first step of every scenario process consists of defining the field. What is being 
examined? What is the scenario topic? How is the field delineated and – just as 
important – what is consciously being left out? What are the reasons for conducting 
a scenario process and what are the focal questions this process ultimately seeks to 
answer? 
At the beginning of the scenario process, comprehensive decisions 
regarding relevancy are to be made regarding the boundaries of the field 
which will be taken under study. For example, will a self-contained field of 
organization – such as a business enterprise, a clearly defined area of 
technology, or an organization […] be observed, meaning its internal 
factors alone? Or will mostly external factors, that is, the world 
immediately around it, be taken under study? Such ‘surroundings’ 
scenarios may well include the widest possible variety of dimensions: 
environmental, economic, political, technical, and cultural factors. Or will 
the internal arena and the surroundings, together with their 
interrelationships, be taken for study as a system, resulting quite 
deliberately in so-called ‘system scenarios’? (Kosow and Gaßner 2008: 26) 
It is at this point, be it implicitly or explicitly, that the type of scenario is being 
chosen. While each scenario process is different, and the combinations of focal 
questions and limitations (as well as delimitations) are endless, van Notten et al. 
(2003: 426) provide a useful typology of scenarios to use when considering scenario 
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Figure 2: Typology of Scenarios 
Source: van Notten et al. (2003: 426) 
3.2.2 Key Factor Identification 
How key factors are identified varies in both theory and practice (Kosow and Gaßner 
2008). While some authors propose extensive desk research to reach analytical and 
theoretical depth, others opt for a more participatory approach, focusing on intuitive 
and implicit knowledge, thereby furthering a broad picture, rather than a deep one. 
In the first approach, concrete decisions by the project team (the group organising 
the scenario project) are central, while in the second approach, key success factors 
are the composition of workshop participants and procedural guidance. 
In the case of EU-LISTCO, a participatory approach will be used. This will both make 
effective use of participants’ knowledge – which can be seen as both deeper and 
broader than that of the project team – and create ownership of the scenarios, 
making them more likely to be fruitfully used for policy recommendations and 
research at a later stage. In an online survey, participants will engage in what is 
known as horizon scanning. Horizon scanning is a process in which a broad range of 
political, economic, social, technological, environmental and other factors are 
identified. Participants are asked to identify those factors that they feel will influence 
the topic from the present to – in the case of EU-LISTCO – 2023. This is done in order 
to open up complexity and get a broad overview of the topic in question. The results 
of the survey are clustered, resulting in 35-45 descriptors of the defined scenario 
topic. This clustering process is undertaken by the project team in order to make 
sense of the survey results, to avoid double mentions, and to transform the results 
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3.2.3 Key Factor Analysis 
The analysis of key factors can be carried out in various ways, though “it always 
contains intuitive and creative aspects; these are essential for visualizing the various 
future developments on any key factor” (Kosow and Gaßner 2008: 27). 
As a first step, key factors are analysed to determine their relevance for the scenario 
construction. Depending on the scenario type, this can be done through cross-impact 
balances (Weimer-Jehle 2006), trend impact analysis (Gordon 2003), sensitivity 
analysis (Saltelli 2004) and other quantified and qualitative methods. One of the more 
feasible methods that has proven its value in practice is uncertainty-impact analysis, 
especially since it can fruitfully be carried out online in advance of the actual 
workshop. In such an online survey, participants reduce complexity and focus on key 
uncertainties. Key uncertainties are produced by asking participants to rate the 
descriptors from the first survey in terms of uncertainty and impact. This 
assessment is an exercise in relativity. In two separate assessments, participants are 
asked to assess the whole list of descriptors relative to each other regarding first 
uncertainty and then impact. Combining and visualising these two assessments 
produces an uncertainty-impact diagram. Descriptors that rate highly on both 
uncertainty and impact can be seen as those factors with a significant potential for 
change. Developments that are both highly uncertain and highly impactful are useful 
for the construction of scenarios as they have the ability to change the future of the 
scenario topic in different directions. The results of the uncertainty-impact analysis 
are taken to the workshop and – depending on group size and workshop schedule – 
six to eight key uncertainties are selected in the plenary for further elaboration. In 
order to ensure common understanding and enable later communication about the 
topic, the selected key uncertainties are collectively defined. Participants develop a 
short definition as well as a shared view on the past development and current state 
of each key uncertainty. 
In a second step of the key factor analysis, the chosen key factors are analysed 
regarding their potential states in the future: 
This brings us to the step which is especially typical of scenario 
techniques and sets them apart from other methods: the widening 
scenario ‘funnel’ in which individual key factors are subjected to analysis 
to find what possible future salient characteristics are conceivable in each 
case. An individual ‘funnel opening into the future,’ so to speak, widens 
out for each factor inasmuch as those salient characteristics are selected 
which are to become part of the budding scenario. (Kosow and Gaßner 
2008: 27) 
In practice, participants are divided into working groups and each group is assigned 
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projections. Key uncertainty projections are possible states the key uncertainty could 
be in, in the year 2023. Each group is asked to develop a set of projections that are 
mutually exclusive yet collectively exhaustive, meaning projections should not 
overlap, while at the same time covering the complete spectrum of conceivable 
possibilities in the given timeframe. The goal is to break down the complex question 
of what the future could look like in 2023 into smaller components, resulting in key 
uncertainties – that carry a high potential for change – and their corresponding 
possible states in the future. 
3.2.4 Scenario Generation 
In order to create so-called raw scenarios, consistent combinations of key uncertainty 
projections need to be bundled and selected. The GBN Matrix has become the 
standard in scenario generation techniques since its publication in 1991 by Peter 
Schwartz, founder of the foresight consultancy Global Business Network (GBN) 
(Schwartz 2012). However, since this technique only encompasses two fact rs with 
two projections each, it is not suited to deal with the complex surroundings of 
emerging violent conflict and governance breakdown. Other, much more elaborate 
methods include Option Development and Option Evaluation, distributed in the Eidos 
toolkit by the Parmenides Foundation, and the MORPHOL computer program, which 
performs complete morphological analyses and reduces the outcome based on user-
defined exclusions (Godet and Roubelat 1996). 
A method of scenario generation that allows for more complexity, while still being 
feasible in a short workshop setting is the (reduced) morphological analysis (Coyle 
2003; Coyle et al. 1994; Duczynski 2000; Eriksson and Ritchey 2005; Ritchey 2009). In 
a general sense, a morphological analysis is a method for non-quantified modelling. 
It seeks to structure wicked problems that involve human behaviour and political 
choice, making them unsuitable for quantified or causal modelling. The two 
dimensions of the so-called morphological field are constructed by listing the key 
uncertainties on the y-axis and their corresponding projections along the x-axis. This 
produces a field of all key uncertainty projections relevant to the construction of 
scenario frameworks. A scenario framework can thus be constructed by vertically 
connecting one key uncertainty projection of each key uncertainty. 
This connection of key uncertainty projections can be done in myriad ways. In the 
context of EU-LISTCO it will be a qualitative group process of not only connecting 
the projections – thus coming up with scenario frameworks – but also discursively 
adding necessary background conditions in order to make the connections between 
projections plausible and logically consistent. By adding background conditions at 
this point, it allows participants’ background knowledge to enter the process, 
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3.2.5 Scenario Transfer 
As argued above, scenarios must always consist of a description of the future 
situation as well as of a description of highly plausible developments leading up to 
that situation. In this context we call these descriptions picture of the future and history 
of the future respectively. There is some debate in the literature as to whether or not 
these descriptions should be seen as being part of the scenario transfer, or if they 
deserve a category of their own (Greeuw et al. 2000). 
In order to create a picture of the future, raw scenarios (in the form of scenario 
frameworks) are taken as a basis. While there are highly formalised techniques to do 
such modelling – e.g., dynamic scenarios (Ward and Schriefer 2003) – more free-
flowing techniques in a (reverse) mind mapping process have proven useful in 
workshop settings similar to EU-LISTCO. Participants are split into working groups 
of members. Each group chooses one of the developed scenario frameworks on 
which to elaborate. In the first step of this scenario development, each group is ask d 
to develop a picture of the future. At this stage, participants take the chosen scenario 
framework and develop a coherent snapshot – a mental image of a point in time – of 
the situation in 2023. They do so by relating the key uncertainty projections of their 
framework to each other, discussing interrelations and adding background 
conditions. Since the development of these pictures of the future is heavily guided 
by the scenario frameworks, the different groups should have very different 
descriptions of what their situation in 2023 could look like. The goal is to develop 
snapshots that are neither obvious, nor absurd. The background conditions discussed 
in the plenary in the scenario construction – i.e., during the linking of key uncertainty 
projections – help to walk this line. 
The second step in the scenario development aims at histories of the future, i.e., 
exemplary chains of events that illustrate plausible developments leading up to the 
respective pictures. These chains of events are constructed backwards – starting in 
2023 and finishing in the present – in order to prevent linear extrapolation and to 
proactively include structural change. They describe coherent and connected 
histories while at the same time illustrating parallel and interlinked developments. 
Histories of the future serve a double purpose; one internal and one external. 
Internally, they are a means to validating plausibility (what must have happened for 
the situation in 2023 to have become [fictional] reality?). Externally, they serve as 
tools to better communicate constructed plausibility to group outsiders. The 
techniques here range from rather free-flowing approaches such as the ‘horizon 
mission methodology’ (Hojer and Mattsson 1999), via technologically supported 
approaches, such as the Impact of Future Technologies by the IBM Corporation (Strong 
2007), to highly pre-structured approaches, like Future Mapping (Mason 2003), where 
participants are merely asked to arrange pre-defined events. Additional techniques 
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Figure 3: Possible transfer steps 
Source: Kosow and Gaßner (2008: 79) 
Wild cards deserve a special mention at this point, although they are technically not 
exclusively scenario transfer methods, since they can be incorporated during the 
scenario building process as well. Scenarios have to be highly consistent and 
plausible and thus often have to neglect improbable singular events. This tendency 
to err on the conservative side can be countered by introducing disruptive events to 
highlight uncertainties. Wild cards can be defined as: 
• Discontinuous events, i.e., serious individual events, 
• less probable events whose probability is difficult to estimate, 
• but which have, when they enter the picture, a deep and far-reaching impact, 
• are perceived as surprising, and 
• alter the manner in which we think about the future and about the past; that is, they 
change our ‘thought patterns’, along with the interpretive templates with which we 
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Steinmüller and Steinmüller (2003) have categorized an entire catalogue of potential 
wild cards. But wild cards can also be generated in a participatory manner, within the 
foresight process: 
Support for the identification of relevant disruptive events can be 
provided, for example, in the form of brainstorming sessions, surveys of 
experts, finding historical analogies, or even via an evaluation of science-
fiction. This is, however, invariably difficult, and it is best to call upon the 
help of external competence as a means of reducing ‘professional 
blindness’. (Kosow and Gaßner 2008: 81) 
The challenge in the EU-LISTCO research will be to identify the combination of 
scenario transfer techniques that are best suited to provide useful foresight 
regarding the emergence of violent conflict and governance breakdown. Participants 
could for example be asked to present their scenario, including their picture of the 
future and history of the future. In a facilitated group discussion, the plenary identifies 
drivers, tipping points, and threats to the EU for each presented scenario. Guiding 
questions focus on the relevant drivers in the scenario, tipping points and points of 
no return, as well as potential immediate threats to the EU’s security. The 
discussions are recorded and subsequently evaluated by the program team. The 
program team then also writes narrative versions of the scenario, paying special 
attention to the points raised in the discussion. These narratives and additional 
visualisations of each scenario are then played back to the participants for further 
elaboration and comments. 
3.2.6 Ideal-Typical Scenarios 
The literature identifies three ideal-typical scenario approaches, visualised in    
figure 4: 
 Trend-based scenario techniques 
 Systematic-formalised scenario techniques 
 Creative-narrative scenario techniques 
While the first of these techniques is solely based on trends, the second and third 
have in common that they are key factor-based approaches. However, in practice 
these boundaries are rather blurry. Quantitative trends regularly enter both kinds of 
key factor-based processes, and systematic-formalised approaches are rarely carried 
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Figure 4: Ideal-type scenario approaches 
Source: Kosow and Gaßner (2008: 78) 
In the context of EU-LISTCO, trend-based scenarios can seemingly be disregarded, as 
the goal of the project is to find new risks rather than looking at how existing risks 
might develop. However, there might be room for adjustment, for example, by 
replacing the focus on trends with a focus on weak signals (Mendonça et al. 2012), 
black swans (Taleb 2007), or black elephants (Sardar and Sweeny 2016). One of the 
central questions within the qualitative foresight part of EU-LISTCO will be whether 
or not a foresight process tailored to address the emergence of violent conflict and 
governance breakdown fits into one of the ideal-typical scenario techniques or is 
deserving of a category of its own. 
3.2.7 Scenarios and Delphi Techniques 
The Delphi technique is a systematic survey of experts over several rounds (Häder 
2002). This empirical approach to uncertainty was originally conceived to be carried 
out via overland mail, then was increasingly done via e-mail, and is today sometimes 
completely browser-based, e.g., in the case of Real Time Delphi, where the concept of 
several iterations through subsequent rounds has been abandoned. Instead, 
participants can access the platform at any time and adjust their answers, while 
always being provided with the current state of other participants’ aggregated 
opinions (Gordon and Pease 2006). 
The Delphi technique can be effectively combined with scenarios, as outlined in 
Figure 5. Finished scenarios can be fed into the Delphi study in order to foster the 
participants’ imaginations. Conversely, the results of a Delphi study can be used in 
the process of scenario construction, especially during the first three stages of 
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Figure 5: Scenarios and Delphi techniques 
Source: Kosow and Gaßner (2008: 88) 
Kosow and Gaßner (2008) identify two key success factors when combining Delphi 
with scenarios: 
In creating the scenario, the project team which was previously 
responsible for the Delphi survey was altered in part by the addition of 
new partners and the replacement of some by others. This addition of 
outside views proved to be very helpful as a means of keeping the process 
from ‘getting stuck in the mud’ of ‘tried-and-true’ perspectives. 
It is also to be recommended that different teams be assigned to work out 
scenario components for each individual topic area; this prevents them 
from consciously – or unconsciously – making a priori suggestions for 
specific constellations. Moreover, the evaluation of combinations of key 
factors as being consistent or inconsistent is central to the development of 
the scenario and should be carried out in the context of a workshop and as 
far as possible together with other stakeholders and experts than the ones 
who have worked out the key factors. (2008: 89) 
In the context of EU-LISTCO, (Real Time) Delphi techniques could well be used to 
either delineate the scenario topic or to find (and simultaneously assess) key factors. 
The use of Delphi techniques would counter the limited time available in the 
workshops and – compared to simpler kinds of surveys – validate the starting points 
for the scenarios. The challenges lie in practical feasibility, since “Delphi surveys 
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involvement of a large number of experts” (Kosow and Gaßner 2008: 89). 
4. INTEGRATING QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE METHODS 
At an epistemological level, there are fundamental differences between quantitative 
conflict forecasting and qualitative inquiries into the future (Gabriel 2014; Lüdeke 
2013). While the goal of forecasting as “scientific prediction” is to “have as many 
accurate forecasts as possible” (Grimm and Schneider 2011: 19), foresight – 
understood as a scientific enquiry into the future – assumes that “we cannot know 
the future” (Gabriel 2014: 4) and “extrapolation is bound to be wrong” (Gordon and 
Glenn 2004: 107). Debates around positivism, particularly regarding the difference 
between explanation and prediction (see also section 3.1), have contributed to the 
development of parallel research projects on the future of violent conflict that have 
largely been carried out in isolation. The field of future studies, however, is both 
theoretically and methodologically fragmented. This keeps it open to a large and 
growing toolbox of methods that combine advancements in both quantitative and 
qualitative methodological traditions (Gordon et al. 2005). Similarly, the quantitative 
forecasting literature increasingly emphasises the need for dynamic modelling and 
the potential for combining qualitative judgement and prediction. This provides a 
rich basis for developing a future research methodology to identify risks for 
governance breakdown and violent conflict that includes both quantitative and 
qualitative tools. 
4.1 Quantitative Approaches in Foresight Processes 
A variety of methods listed in future research toolboxes benefit from quantitative 
input. For example, looking at descriptive statistics about phenomena can already 
give useful indications of the present values’ distributions. This can help set the 
stage for informed discussions among experts in a collaborative, scenario-based 
process. Similarly, statistical tools such as basic correlations or time series analyses 
that extrapolate data trends and developments can be used to inform participants 
about potential or expected developments based on data analysis (Lüdeke 2013). 
Beyond statistics, there are examples of a combination of qualitative processes with 
more advanced mathematical models that include dynamic simulation of variables 
and explanatory pretensions. The main advantage of these is that computational 
models can perform rigorous logical deduction better than most human experts, 
answering purely mathematical what-if questions with large amounts of input data 
while even taking into account dynamic variable interaction (Lüdeke 2013). The 
application of regression analysis and dynamic modelling can also be used to 
produce quantitative or mixed-methods scenarios (Gordon and Glenn 2004). 
Advancements in the field of dynamic modelling for social sciences make it easier to 
marry qualitative
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account for time-sensitive relationships between variables and produce output that 
is more appropriate for decision making under the assumption of fundamental 
uncertainty (Gordon et al. 2005).
 
Another well-established combination of quantitative and qualitative methods in 
future research is concerned with the identification and treatment of outliers. While 
quantitative models, depending on model specification, tend to regard outlier cases 
as largely irrelevant, many foresight methods explicitly search for extreme classes of 
phenomena that can be outliers, like black swans or elephants (Taleb 2007; Sardar 
and Sweeney 2016). Quantitative analyses can help identify those phenomena, while 
qualitative methods like scenario description and backcasting are more useful for 
contextualisation and constant re-interpretation of influential factors (Lüdeke 2013). 
In EU-LISTCO’s scenario methodology, for example, simple statistical calculation is 
used to analyse Delphi survey results and identify risks that are rated as low 
likelihood, high impact by participants – potential critical but overlooked risks. 
Cross-impact analyses also use simple calculations to compare and classify risks and 
facilitate the selection process in a collaborative setting, before the construction of 
qualitative scenarios takes advantage of the detailed regional or sectoral knowledge 
of experts. 
Case selection for qualitative elaboration can further be facilitated by using Boolean 
variables (QCA) (Ragin 1994) or systems analysis with ordinal variables (QDE) 
(Kuipers 1994). Both of these are examples of variable-oriented methods that work 
with data on weaker than ratio scales and allow a selection of cases through 
specification of certain scope conditions to different extents, also involving 
qualitative information at the moment of input specification (see Lüdeke 2013). As 
Lüdeke points out, QDE is an appropriate method to fulfil model specification 
transparency, but the results can be ambiguous. Examples of triangulation with 
these methods have combined QDE in the initial stage of deductive reasoning in 
foresight processes with a subsequent qualitative part to maximise transparency and 
mutual understanding of assumptions and reasoning between systems, analytical 
models, and qualitative experts – e.g., in climate research (e.g., Luna-Reyes and 
Andersen [2003]; Lüdeke [2013]). 
4.2 Prediction and Judgement: Converging Approaches 
Chadefaux (2017) argues that despite average poor predictive value, human 
judgement can be used to inform and improve the predictions of algorithms or 
superforecasters. The latter are people with above average abilities to predict political 
and geopolitical events, identified in forecasting tournaments by Tetlock and 
colleagues (Tetlock 2005; Tetlock and Gardner 2016). Grimm and Schneider (2011) 
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combination of structural, dynamic and game-theoretic approaches. According to 
Chadefaux (2017), the combination of expert forecasting tournaments with game-
theoretic simulations, prediction markets, and advanced quantitative simulations is 
among the most promising avenues for improving conflict prediction. 
One example of the integration of expert judgement on the side of quantitative 
social science research is the use of priors based on expert assessment in Bayesian 
frameworks (Gill and Walker 2005; Montgomery et al. 2012; Morris 1977). This 
approach allows the systematic introduction of qualitative area expertise as 
information into quantitative models (Gill and Walker 2005). Tree-based Bayesian 
frameworks such as random forest algorithms have multiple advantages for cases in 
which prediction instead of explanation is the explicit goal of research and they 
perform better than logistic regression for class-imbalanced data on phenomena like 
civil war onset (Muchlinski et al. 2016). Working in a Bayesian modelling framework 
to combine qualitative expertise and quantitative forecasting technique  will be one 
of EU-LISTCO’s innovations linking the two approaches. 
A challenge in integrating quantitative and qualitative methods in future studies is 
reconciling the assumptions of both fields. Acknowledging the over-reliance on 
extrapolation of historical data, the emphasis lies in allowing the consideration of 
fundamental uncertainty by dynamically simulating a variety of potential 
trajectories that take into account possible changes in the system underlying the 
simulation. Pacinelli (2008) lists several future studies methods that attempt to 
combine judgement and statistics to account for different perceptions about change. 
These considerations show that suggested improvements in foresight and future 
studies converge with current developments in quantitative conflict research 
regarding dynamic analysis and the potential for including expert judgement. 
4.3 Implications for Policy- And Decision-Making 
In cases of quantitative input into a qualitative, expert-based foresight process, 
transparent modelling and a careful interpretation of quantitative results in light of 
the operationalisation of key variables is crucial. As Pacinelli (2008) emphasises, the 
reliance of quantitative forecasting on the extrapolation of historical data is 
problematic if assumptions are not explicitly stated. If the sources of quantitative 
results are not communicated to participants in an understandable way, these parts 
of the analysis effectively function like a black box, which can lead to 
misunderstandings or misinterpretations. The disciplinary and methodological 
background of experts involved in the foresight processes must thus be taken into 
account before deciding to include quantitative reasoning about the future. If 
quantitative and qualitative parts of the analysis are to build on and inform each 
other, researchers need to consider the added value of mathematical reasoning 
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with such tools. In the case of a scenario process with regional and policy experts, for 
example, transparency about mathematical models alone cannot ensure an 
appropriate reflection of differences in explanatory value regarding the statistical, 
simulated and quantitative arguments involved (see Lüdeke [2013]). 
One case in point here is the definition and operationalisation of variables into 
observable indicators for statistical analyses. These analyses start after decisions 
about definition and operationalisation are made. In contrast to rich, qualitative 
description, this is a process that abstracts the phenomenon at hand from its context. 
Interrelations of variables are kept constant and there is no consideration of 
dynamic, time-sensitive interrelations (Lüdeke 2013). Such an approach to modelling 
is still present in quantitative conflict and governance research, being only recently 
complemented with dynamic models (Muchlinski et al. 2016). The understanding of 
input, logic, and interpretability of results in such analyses need to be taken into 
account and clearly communicated to experts involved in the foresight process to 
enable them to reflect on the explanatory value of extrapolation and qualitative 
description for complex social phenomena. 
Robust Decision Making (RDM) may facilitate decision-making processes with 
quantitative methods and takes seriously the risk that policy makers tend to either 
over-estimate the value of predictions or discount quantitative results as lacking 
reliability (Groves and Lempert 2007; Lempert et al. 2013). In this method, a potential 
future policy decision is taken as a basis for the backward running of multiple 
models with different sets of assumptions to simulate the implications of the 
decision across a range of possible futures. This is an example of an “ex-ante 
simulation of policy choices” effects’ called for by Grimm and Schneider, speaking to 
their criticism that the “increasing number of sophisticated forecasts” do not take 
into account that “the real usefulness of forecasting is the evaluation of how various 
political instruments are able to address the challenge of social tipping points” 
(2011:13). RDM identifies the futures most relevant to the plan’s success, which helps 
understand the scope conditions for the potential future performance of a policy 
decision. It combines features of both scenarios and probabilistic risk assessment, 
without relying on simple predictions. RDM is designed according to users’ needs 
and should help facilitate the interaction of policymakers and experts with a 
computational tool that can handle large amounts of data and model specification 
(Lempert et al. 2013). It represents an application of quantitative methods that, instead 
of simplifying reality, takes into account the potential outcomes of a variety of 
future developments with the aim of making plans that can succeed under 
conditions of uncertainty and a range of possible futures (Lempert et al. 2013). Other 
examples of applications of quantitative methods in decision-making analysis worth 
considering include utility matrices, cost-benefit-analyses, or payoff matrices that 
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5. CONCLUSION: COMBINING FORECASTING AND FORESIGHT 
FOR STRATEGIC POLICY PLANNING 
Quantitative methods for forecasting violent conflict and political violence are 
available and have improved during the last decades, while governance breakdown 
as a dependent variable, as well as limited statehood and contested orders as 
predictors have, to date, not been included. For short-term time horizons (days, 
weeks or months into the future) in particular, extrapolating the development of key 
variables based on past trends has proven useful in predicting the probability of 
violence on the national and sub-national level. EU-LISTCO plans to target existing 
efforts toward the project’s specific phenomena of interest, including governance 
breakdown and accounting for both areas of limited statehood and governance 
breakdown to help anticipate threats. Examples of phenomena that quantitative 
forecasting cannot take into account are diffuse risks like disruptive technological 
advancements or long-term developments of societal resilience – both of which are 
of interest to EU-LISTCO. Due to its epistemological foundations and m thodological 
constraints, the quantitative approach tends to underestimate fundamental change 
in favour of gradual, linear developments. This is also the reason such analyses 
cannot account for human agency – e.g., with regard to political decisions or other 
events related to spontaneous action. These phenomena are often identified as 
critical junctures that changed the course of history in ex-post qualitative process-
tracing analyses (Collier 2011). 
This is where scenario-based foresight comes in, as it explicitly focuses on the 
possibility and uncertainty of fundamental change. Starting from the premise that 
the future cannot be known, this approach emphasizes analysis of current 
expectations about possible futures and their implications for policy design for a 
time horizon of up to decades (see Gabriel [2014]). In order to do so, there is a large 
set of tools to choose from. However, the field is not yet well organised, and a 
consolidated state of the art is lacking. This is especially true when it comes to 
scenario-based foresight approaches in relation to risk. Nevertheless, there are 
combinations of techniques that promise fruitful results once put into practice. The 
EU-LISTCO project provides the chance to develop scenario-based foresight 
approaches tailored specifically to risks and threats, including methods that 
facilitate reverse process-tracing to address the possibility of spontaneous human 
agency and non-structural change. 
A comparative view of quantitative and qualitative methods shows two things. First, 
while existing quantitative and scenario-based approaches differ in their theoretical 
foundations, both of these toolkits or methodological traditions have their respective 
limitations which the other can help overcome. At the borders of both disciplines, 
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interaction. While both the quantitative and qualitative parts of the projects will 
contribute individually to the project’s aim of understanding tipping points, EU-
LISTCO is an opportunity to bring together two approaches whose developments 
already seem to be converging, especially when it comes to the combination of 
human judgement with dynamic models and decision-making algorithms. 
Second, the challenge of anticipating security risks for strategic policy design is a 
case which is particularly well-suited to experimenting with methodological 
combinations. While it is important to be able to anticipate the escalation of violent 
conflict in the near future as precisely as possible, and existing quantitative research 
on violent conflict enables this to a certain degree, the onset and escalation of 
conflict and processes of governance breakdown are impacted by a range of factors 
that do not follow gradual structural change. EU-LISTCO’s efforts at anticipating 
governance breakdown and violent conflict aim at identifying how quantitative 
input can enrich qualitative foresight processes and how the results of these 
processes can in turn help shape quantitative research. 
One concrete opportunity for this is the identification of possible tipping points. 
Quantitative research provides experts with information on what the predictors or 
influential factors for violent conflict and governance breakdown are. Experts are 
then asked to imagine exactly how these influential factors might tip over and 
become actual threats. The latter is also an entry point for discussing the possibility of 
policy responses to transform risks into opportunities for building resilience, an 
element discussed in EU-LISTCO’s policy planning workshops. In addition, tipping 
points identified in the scenarios can provide new influential factors for quantitative 
researchers to study and see if the correlation developed in thought experiments is 
quantitatively verifiable. Of course, we hope that both the innovations that the 
project will contribute to sub-national forecasting of governance breakdown and 
violent conflict and the identification, assessment, and elaboration of tipping points 
through scenario-based foresight can be translated to other research and policy 
fields that are confronted with an uncertain future and both structural change and 
complex systems. 
In the design of the project and the objectives of a study on anticipating governance 
breakdown and violent conflict objectives, particular consideration is given to the 
applicability of these methods to study the future in (foreign) policy planning 
processes. The combination of quantitative and qualitative future studies methods 
developed for EU-LISTCO already mirrors existing efforts to improve policy 
planning and crisis management in bureaucratic institutions, where there seems to 
be an increasing willingness to use a variety of tools. Experimenting with an 
interaction of qualitative expert assessments and quantitative elements in risk 
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challenges of translating arguments between the research and policy communities. 
The participation of both researchers and policy planners in the structured group 
communication processes for both threat scanning and policy planning is a crucial 
element to test the methodology’s practicability and relevance for the EU’s foreign 
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